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Central-provincial and provincial-local fiscal transfers are the dominant source of 
revenues of provincial and local governments in China.  In 2003, they financed 67 
percent of provincial, 57 percent of prefecture and 66 percent of country and lower level 
expenditures (Qiao and Shah, 2006). In China, most of the service delivery 
responsibilities are assigned to the subnational governments. Yet, for reasons of 
efficiency in tax collection and administration the central government collects revenues 
far in excess of its expenditure needs.  In 2003, the central government collected 70 
percent of consolidated revenues but accounted for only 30 percent of consolidated 
expenditures. The initial fiscal surplus of the central government enables it to use its 
spending power to provide financing to subnational jurisdictions for the achievement of 
national objectives and to influence local priorities.  This paper examines the incentives 
associated with the design of such transfers and their implications for the efficiency and 
equity of public service provision and accountable local governance in China. The paper 
is organized as follows. Section 1 presents an overview of the structure of central-
provincial fiscal transfers.  Section 2 provides a summary of the existing provincial-local 
transfers.  Section 3 examines the economic impact of these programs empirically. 
Section 4 highlights conceptual and practical design considerations in designing fiscal 
transfers.  Section 5 presents a review of the existing structure of intergovernmental 
transfers. Section 6 identifies principal issues for an agenda for restructuring. Finally, 
section 7 presents some ideas on possible options for a reform of the existing system of 
fiscal transfers to further national objectives.    
 
1. The Existing System of Central-Provincial Transfers 
The fiscal system in China is based upon a layer cake model where there is a strict 
vertical hierarchical relationship among different orders of government. Therefore, the    
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central government only determines transfers to provincial level governments
2 and there 
are no direct central grants to prefecture, county, or township governments. It is worth 
mentioning that county governments get transfers directly from provincial-level 
governments in seven provinces (Anhui, Fujian, Heilongjiang, Hainan, Hubei, Ningxia, 
and Zhejiang) and four metropolitan areas (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing) 
as well as in the five separately planned cities where the “province managing county” 
model has been implemented by the year 2005 (see Figure 1). The sub-provincial transfer 
design is similar to that of central transfers to provincial governments, though the grant 
composition varies significantly across provinces due to the diversity of regional fiscal 
resources.   
Central transfers in China can be classified into two broad categories: general 
purpose and specific purpose transfers.  The general purpose transfers consist of (a) 
revenue-sharing transfers (b) the tax rebate designed to return a fraction of revenues by 
origin (province of collection), and  (c) the equalization transfer established in 1995 in an 
effort to ease the widening  regional disparities. The equalization transfer was called 
“transitory period grant” until 2001 and then renamed “the general-purpose grant” since 
2002. These three transfers constituted 63.8 percent of total central transfers in 2004. The 
equalization grant has grown rapidly in size from only 2.07 billion yuan in its initial year 
to 74.5 billion yuan in 2004. Specific purpose transfers include (a) grants for increasing 
wages (b) grants for rural tax reform (c) grants for minority regions (d) prio-1994 
subsidies (e) other ad hoc transfers.  About 200 plus ad hoc grants, termed the earmarked 
grants (Zhuanxiang Zhuanyi Zhifu) by the Ministry of Finance, China, are used to 
subsidize a wide variety of spending projects such as capital constructions and social 
relief for calamities.  In 2004, the largest central-provincial fiscal transfer was the 
revenue sharing transfers (469.5 billion yuan), followed by the tax rebate (404.97 billion 
yuan) and earmarked grants (322.33 billion). These three transfers combined accounted 
for more than 80 percent of the total central-provincial transfers. The 2004 equalization 
transfer was 74.50 billion yuan, amounting to 5 percent of the total central-provincial 
transfers (see Table 1).  
                                                 
2 The five separately planned cities, Dalian, Qingdao, Shenzhen, Xiamen, and Ningbo, are treated as 









Table 2 (see also Figure 2) presents an overview of various transfer programs in 
2004
3.  For the total central transfers, Shanghai, the richest province, was the highest per 
capita recipient province (5,079 yuan) and Henan the lowest (646 yuan) with the national 
average of 1117 yuan per capita. When it comes to revenue sharing transfers, Shanghai 
obtained the national highest per capita transfers of 2,830 yuan; Hainan received the 
lowest within the eastern region (179 yuan); Shanxi and Xinjiang were the highest 
recipients in the central and western regions respectively; and Tibet received the lowest 
in the western China and also in the nation. As for the tax rebate, Shanghai, Jilin, and 
Yunnan received the largest amount in the eastern, central, and western China 
respectively. For obvious reasons, the six coastal provinces – Beijing, Guangdong, 
Jiangsu, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Zhejiang did not receive any equalization transfers. Tibet 
received the highest per capita equalization transfer of 705 yuan.  
                                                 
3 Eastern China includes 11 provinces: Beijing, Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan, Hebei, Jiangsu, Liaoning, 
Shandong, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Zhejiang; Central China consists of 8 provinces: Anhui, Heilongjiang, 





















































































The total central transfers also include revenue sharing transfers that are 25% of VAT and 40% of Personal and Enterprise Income 
Taxes in each province.  
Authors’ own calculation.    
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Table 1   Intergovernmental Transfers in China 

































General Purpose Transfers 
Revenue Sharing Transfers
2 469.5 31.6 355.6 30.6  231.0 28.8 111.4 20.6
Tax Rebate  405.0 27.2 342.4 29.5 166.7 20.8 126.2 23.3
Equalization Transfer
3 74.5 5.0 38.0 3.3  39.6 4.9 30.5 5.6
Subtotal  949.0 63.8          
               
Specific Purpose Transfers 
Grants for Increasing Wages  91.9 6.2 89.9 7.7  79.2 9.9 68.5 12.7
Grants for Rural Tax Reform  52.3 3.5 30.5 2.6  33.0 4.1 33.8 6.3
Grants for Minority Regions  7.7 0.5 5.8 0.5  1.7 0.2 1.7 0.3
Prio-1994 Subsidies  12.6 0.8 12.4 1.1  18.2 2.3 16.5 3.0
Ad Hoc Transfers
4 322.3 21.7 242.6 20.9  149.3 18.6 98.2 18.1
Others
5 51.4 3.5 43.7 3.8  84.2 10.4 54.4 10.1
Subtotal  538.2 36.2          
               
Total  1487.2 100.0 1160.8 100.0 802.7 100.0 541.2 100.0
               
Percentage of Local 
Expenditure       67    57   66  
Notes:  
1. Whether counties get transfers from provincial or prefectural level government is dependent upon whether the province has implemented “province managing county” reform. 
2. Revenue sharing transfers from 2002 include the following shared taxes: VAT, Enterprise Income Tax, and Personal Income Tax; before 2002, the revenue sharing transfers only reflected the 
amount of local VAT revenue. 
3. The Equalization Transfer refers to the Transitory Period Grant established since 1995. 
4. Ad Hoc Transfers refer to the earmarked grants (Zhuanxiang Zhuanyi Zhifu) as categorized in the MOF dataset. 
5. Others include various accounting closing transfers, civil service unit reform subsidies, and the non-categorized transfers in the MOF dataset. 
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Table 2   A Regional Perspective on China’s Central Transfers (2004) 
Unit: per capita yuan 
  Nation-wide Eastern  PRC Central PRC  Western PRC 




















                   






























































                   



















(Tibet)  366 



















(Tibet)  1075   
The total central transfers also include revenue sharing transfers that are 25 percent of VAT and 40 percent of personal and enterprise incomes taxes in each province.  
Authors’ own calculation    
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General Purpose Transfers 
 
(a) The Revenue Sharing Transfers 
Sub-national governments in China receive 25 percent of the proceeds of the value-added 
tax (VAT) and 40 percent of the enterprise income taxes and the personal income tax 
from the central government. Since the central government determines the tax base, tax 
rate, and collects VAT and most of income taxes, they are more suitably classified as  
general purpose transfers following the general convention in the public finance literature.  
 
(b) The Tax Rebate  
With the 1994 tax reform, VAT and excise taxes were brought under central tax 
administration and a program of tax rebates were instituted for VAT and excise taxes in 
1994 which returned a fraction of these revenues to the province of origin. The provinces 
were assured that under centralized collection, each province would receive at the 
minimum the VAT and excise tax revenues it retained in 1993. For VAT and excise taxes, 
they have also been assured that their current rebates would total last year’s rebate plus 
30% of the growth in VAT and consumption tax revenues (Budget Committee 2002). 
Algebraically,    
  










t t t t
t t ET VAT
ET ET VAT VAT
TR TR  
Where: 
  TRt - tax rebate to a province at year t 
  VAT – value-added tax 
  ET – Excise taxes (Xiaofei Shui) 
  
In 2002, Personal Income Tax and Enterprise Income Tax were also brought under the 
central tax administration and a program of tax rebate similar to VAT tax rebate was 
instituted. Effective on January 1, 2002, all income taxes from enterprises
4 and personal 
                                                 
4 The income tax from the following enterprises is excluded from the sharing policy: rail transportation, 
state post office, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of China,    
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income were shared by the central government and provincial governments at the ratio of 
50 to 50. Since 2003, the central share has been raised to 60 percent. To assure stability in 
provincial revenues, income tax rebate program to instituted to ensure that all provinces 
received income tax revenues no less than what they received in 2001. 
 
(c) The Equalization Transfer  
In 1995, the equalization grant, the first formula based transfer (the so-called transitory 
period grant until 2001) was established with a view to reducing regional fiscal 
disparities. The amount of the equalization transfer for a province i is determined by three 
factors: standard revenue of the province, standard expenditure of the province, and the 








= *  
 
Where 
  i ET -- the equalization transfer for province i 
  TET – total equalization grant available in the budget year 
 SEi – standard expenditure of province i 
 SRi – standard revenue of province i 
  SE – total standard expenditure of the country 
SR – total standard revenue of the country  
  The size of the pool for the equalization transfer (TET) is determined by the 
central government on an ad-hoc basis, subject to annual funding availability.  
The standard revenues are equal to standard local own and shared taxes plus tax 
rebate plus various grants subtracted by remittances to the central government. In the 
formula, tax rebate, various grants, and remittances to the central government are actual 
amounts  paid by the central government. For each type of tax,  standard tax revenue is  
determined by multiplying the  standard tax base  with the standard tax rate. For personal 
                                                                                                                                                 
Construction Bank of China, State Development Bank, China Bank of Agricultural Development, Import 
and Export Bank of China, enterprises of offshore oil and national gas, China Petroleum and Natural Gas 
Co. Limited, and China Petroleum Chemical Co. Limited.     
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income tax, the standard tax base includes salaries and income of private industrial and 
commercial enterprises. The actual income tax collection from other bases is regarded as 
the standard revenue. The income tax base of salaries is estimated using per capita 
taxable salaries net of exemptions and number of employees. The tax rate of salaries is 
local average effective tax rate, adjusted with a regional coefficient. The standard 
expenditures are measured as the total spending of seven sectors and for each sector the 
standard spending cover personal expenditure (salaries and bonus) and office 
expenditures (vehicles, heating, and others).  
Although the equalization grant has been growing rapidly (2.07 billion yuan in 
1995 to 74.5 billion yuan in 2004), growth in specific purpose transfers has outpaced the 
growth of equalization transfers. Figure 3 depicts the trend of funds allocation for the 
revenue sharing transfer, the equalization transfer, tax rebate, the ad hoc transfers, and the 
total transfers for the period of 1995 to 2004.  
 





















Revenue Sharing Transfers The Equalization Transfer Tax Rebate
Ad Hoc Transfers Total  
1. The revenue sharing transfers are only dated to 1998 due to data availability; 2. The ad hoc transfers, called the earmarked grants by 
the Ministry of Finance, account for major portion of the specific purpose transfers. 
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Specific Purpose Transfers  
 
(a) Grants for Increasing Wages of Civil Servants  
When the center raised the wage rate for public sector employees in 1999 and 2001, a 
special grant was established in 1999 to support the implementation of this policy in 
western and central regions. Thus the purpose of this transfer is to fill the fiscal gap 
caused by the central policy mandate. The wage rate was first increased by an amount of 
monthly 120 yuan per capita on July 1, 1999, then further raised at a rate of monthly 100 
yuan per capita on January 1, 2001, and on October 1, 2001, additional 80 yuan per capita 
per month was added. The wage increase was also accompanied by the construction of a 
bonus system for civil servants from 2001 (equivalent to an approximate increase of one 
month of wages) and by the establishment of a subsidy system for remote areas. More 
than 700 counties were eligible to receive this grant. Provinces faced with difficulties of 
paying teachers’ wages in rural elementary and middle schools are also compensated by 
this transfer (Zhang 2003). 
  The grant allocation can be characterized as: 
  i i i o ditureRati BasicExpen e ExpIncreas WageGrant * =   
Where 
  WageGrant – the grant for increasing wages received by province i 
ExpIncrease – the increase of provincial budgetary expenditure due to central 
policy of increasing wages 
BasicExpenditureRatio – the ratio of the personal and office expenses to the total 
disposable revenue of the province i 
According to the formula, the volume of the grant received by province i is dependent 
upon the provincial expenditure increase due to the wage policy and the share of basic 
expenditure (including personnel and office expenses) in the total disposable revenue of 
the province. The increased expenditure is determined by the number of civil servants in 
province i and the standard of wage increase by the central government. The total transfer 
in 2004 amounted to 91.94 billion yuan. 
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(b) Grants for Rural Tax Reform  
The transfer was created in 2000 to foster the implementation of the central policy to 
rescind “three village deductions and five township charges” (xiangtongchou he cun tiliu) 
and gradually abolish agricultural taxes. The “three deductions” collected by villages are: 
collective investment, public welfare funds, and cadre compensation. The “five charges” 
include charges for rural education, family planning, militia training, rural road 
construction and maintenance, and subsidies to entitled groups levied by townships. This 
transfer is aimed at filling the fiscal gap caused by the rural tax reform. In 2004, the total 
of 52.33 billion yuan was transferred to provincial governments.  
 
(c) Grants for Minority Regions 
The grant for minority regions was established in 2000 in order to support economic 
development in minority regions which are usually backward in their economic 
performance. The total grant equals a base amount of 1 billion yuan in 2000 with a yearly 
growth rate equal to that of central VAT revenue, and the rebate of the 80 percent of the 
central increased VAT collection in minority areas. This transfer has risen to 7.69 billion 
yuan in 2004. 
 
(d) Prio-1994 Grandfathered Subsidies 
Prio-1994 subsidies are the contracted fixed grants under the “Fiscal Contracting System” 
during the period 1988-1993. The total of the grant was 12.6 billion yuan in both 2003 
and 2004. Since 1994, local governments have continued to remit revenues to or receive 
transfers from the centre according to their fiscal contracts in effect in 1993. The amount 
of transfers is approximately equal to the estimated deficit (gap between revenue and 
expenditure) measured in the base year. Sixteen provinces, including Inner Mongolia, 
Jilin, Fujian, Jiangxi, Shandong, Guangxi, Hainan, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet, 
Shannxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang, still receive this type of grant. 
 
(e)  Ad hoc transfers 
 The ad hoc transfers are categorized as “earmarked grants” by the Ministry of Finance. 
Various ad hoc transfers to finance various programs have grown over time in number    
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and size. Currently there are about 200 programs accounting for more than 20 percent of 
total central transfers (see Figure 3). These transfers are program-based and allocated for 
specific purposes such as subsidizing agricultural development, supporting infrastructure 
construction, assisting backward regions, and providing emergency funding for natural 
catastrophes. This transfer has risen to 322.3 billion yuan in 2004.  
 
 
2. The Existing Structure of Provincial-Local Fiscal Transfers 
 
All central transfers in China intended for sub-provincial levels pass through the 
provincial governments. It therefore matters how provinces manage their relationships 
with lower orders of government. Currently these relationships are guided by two 
alternate models.  
(a) “Prefecture Managing County” model.  This is a traditional model still practiced in 
twenty provinces as the end of year 2005. In this model, provincial governments only 
deal with prefecture governments on fiscal matters and prefecture governments in turn 
deal with county governments.  
(b) “Province Managing County” model.  Some provincial government by-pass the 
prefecture level and directly relate with county governments on fiscal matters. The fiscal 
connection between the prefecture and the county is entirely removed. The model has 
been implemented in eleven provincial-level governments (Anhui, Fujian, Heilongjiang, 
Hainan, Hubei, Ningxia, Zhejiang, and four metropolitan areas Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, 
and Chongqing) and five separately planned cities (Dalian, Ningbo, Qingdao, Shenzhen, 
and Xiamen) at the end of 2005. 
  The “province managing county” model is receiving substantial popularity in the 
country right now, and it is expected that more provincial governments will adopt it in the 
near future. Further down the bureaucratic level, county governments provide transfers to 
the township governments in most cases. For some poor jurisdictions, central government 
encourages a “county replacing township” model in which the township government no 
long acts as an independent budget unit. It is hoped that government efficiency can be 
improved with less managerial layers.     
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The sub-provincial transfers, congruent with the structure and allocation criteria 
of central transfers, can be similarly divided into two major categories: the general 
purpose grants and the specific purpose grants. The general purpose grants include 
revenue sharing transfers, tax rebate, and the equalization transfer. The specific purpose 
transfers consist of grants for increasing wages, grants for rural tax reform, grants for 
minority regions, prio-1994 subsidies, and ad hoc transfers. The equalization transfer and 
the tax rebate are regulated by the center and calculated by identical formulas at sub-
national levels. The composition of intergovernmental transfers at the provincial, 
prefecture, and county levels is shown in Figure 4. Table 1 shows pass through of these 
transfers. Of the total amount of transfers received from the center, provincial 
government retained 29.20% and passed 70.8% to prefectures. Prefectures in return 
passed 75.4% to county governments.  
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Figure 4  Comparison of the Transfer Composition at Different Level of Government in 
China, 2003 
Central – Provincial (Total: 1160.8 billion yuan) 
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3. The Empirical Impact of Existing System of Fiscal Transfers 
The empirical impact of the existing system of transfers can shed light on the 
achievement of their objectives in practice. In the following paragraphs, we primarily 
examine the equalization impacts of major transfer programs. 
 
The Equalization Transfer 
Table 3 reports the correlation between per-capita equalization transfer and available 
indices of fiscal capacity and needs by province. Per capita transfers show a negative 
correlation with provincial gross domestic product and per capita provincial revenues. Per 
capita transfers are positively correlated with per capita provincial expenditures and 
provincial unemployment rate. But the correlation is mild as reflected by the relatively 
low value of the indicator. A clear visual presentation is provided by the followed charts 
which depict how the per capita equalization transfer is related to the selected economic 
variables respectively. The Gini coefficients of inequality reported in Table 4 suggest that 
the grant has a mildly equalizing impact on provincial revenues (the Gini is slightly 
reduced from 0.365 to 0.351). The weak equalization effect can be mainly attributed to 
the small pool of the grant – the grant only accounted for 7.3 percent of the total central 
transfers and the national per capita receipt of the grant was about 3 yuan. Thus, the 
grant’s redistributive impact is insignificant.  
 
Specific Purpose Transfers 
The various specific purpose grants include grants for minority regions, grants for poor 
remote regions, grants for increasing wages, grants for rural tax reform, prio-1994 
subsidies, and others. Grant allocations show a negative correlation with per capita 
provincial gross domestic product, and per capita provincial revenues (Table 3). Taking 
this type of grant into consideration, the Gini coefficient for provincial revenues is 
reduced from 0.365 to 0.295 (see Table 4). Thus, the grants also have an equalizing 
impact on provincial revenues. 
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Table 3: Various Transfers in Relation to Economic Indicators in China, 2004 
Correlation Coefficient between 
and: 




Per Capita ad hoc 
Transfers 
Per Capita Specific 
Purpose Transfers 
     
a) Per Capita Provincial Gross 
Domestic Product 
 
-0.38 -0.36 -0.28 
b) Per Capita Provincial Revenues 
 
-0.31 -0.28 -0.22 
c) Per Capita Provincial 
Expenditures 
0.18 0.20 0.27 
d) Provincial Unemployment Rate  0.10     
 
Data for provincial gross domestic product, provincial population, provincial revenues, provincial expenditures, and provincial 




Table 4: The Equalization Impact of Central Transfers in China, 2004 
Provincial Governments (N=31)  Mean 
(per capita yuan) 
Weighted Gini Index 
    
Provincial Revenues  904  0.365 
    
+ The Equalization Grant  906  0.351 
+ Ad Hoc Grants  1153  0.283 
+ Specific Purpose Transfers  1070  0.295 


















− ∑ ∑ =  
 
R is the national mean.  i p and j p are the population of province i and j respectively. P is the national population, and n is the 
number of provinces. G varies from 0 for perfect equality to (1- 
p
pi ) for perfect inequality.  
 
 
Other Ad Hoc Grants 
Looking at the relation between the ad hoc grants and selected economic indicators, we 
find that in general the grants bear a negative correlation with per capita provincial gross 
domestic product, and per capita provincial revenues (Table 3). Further, Gini coefficients 
of inequality reported in Table 4 suggest that the grants have an equalizing impact on    
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provincial revenues. The Gini index is reduced from 0.365 to 0.283 after adding the 
grants to per capita provincial revenues. Surprisingly, the equalizing effect of the 
earmarked grants is even stronger than the equalization transfer. It may be partly because 
the per capita equalizing transfer is very small, only about one percent of the per capita 
earmarked grants. While the program appears to promote provincial equity in a limited 
sense, the grant design does not score well on most criteria such as transparency, 
predictability, simplicity and objectivity.    
 
  19
4. Designing Fiscal Transfers for a Harmonious Society and Balanced Regional 
Development: Conceptual and Practical Considerations  
 
(a) Economic Rationale for Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers 
The intergovernmental transfers are the dominant source of revenues for subnational 
governments in China. The design of these transfers is of critical importance for   
efficiency and equity of local service provision and fiscal health of subnational 
governments . For enhancing accountability, it is desirable to match revenue means (the 
ability to raise revenues from own sources) as closely as possible with expenditure needs 
for all orders of government. However, higher level governments must be allowed greater 
access to revenues than needed to fulfill own direct service responsibilities so that they 
are able to use their spending power through fiscal transfers to fulfill national and 
regional efficiency and equity objectives. We can identify six broad objectives for 
national fiscal transfers each of which may apply to varying degree in China and each of 
which calls for a specific design of fiscal transfers (see Table 5).   
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Table 5: Principles and better practices in grant design 
Grant Objective  Grant Design  Better Practices  Practices to avoid 
To bridge fiscal gap  •  Reassign responsibilities 
•  Tax abatement 
•  Tax base sharing 
Tax abatement and tax base 
sharing in Canada  
Deficit grants 
Tax by tax sharing   
To reduce regional 
fiscal disparities 
General Non-matching Fiscal capacity 
equalization transfers 
Fiscal equalization programs of  
Canada and Germany 
General revenue sharing with 
multiple factors 
To compensate for 
benefit spillovers 
Open-ended matching transfers with 
matching rate consistent with spill-out 
of benefits 
Republic of South Africa grant 




Conditional non-matching block 
transfers with conditions on standards of 
service and access 
Indonesia pre-2000 roads and 
primary education grants  
Colombia and Chile education 
transfers, Canada Health  
transfers , SUDS program in 
Brazil 
Conditional transfers with 
conditions on spending alone 
ad hoc grants 
Influencing local 
priorities in areas of 
high national but 
low local priority 
Open-ended matching transfers (with 
preferably matching rate to vary 
inversely with fiscal capacity) 
Matching transfers for social 
assistance as in Canada 
ad hoc grants 
Stabilization   Capital grants provided maintenance 
possible  
Limit use of capital grants and 
encourage private sector 
participation by providing 
political and policy risk 
guarantee 
Stabilization grants with no 
future upkeep requirements 
Source: Shah (1994, 1998, 2004, 2005).    
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 (b) Criteria  for the design of intergovernmental fiscal transfers 
Beyond the economic rationale which argues for consistency of grant design with 
objectives, a number of principles sholuld be considered while designing individual grant 
programs (Shah, 1994).   
Autonomy. Subnational governments should have complete independence and flexibility 
in setting priorities, and should not be constrained by the categorical structure of 
programs and uncertainty associated with decisionmaking at the center. Tax base sharing 
– allowing subnational governments to introduce their own tax rates on central bases, 
formula-based revenue sharing, or block grants – is consistent with this objective. 
Revenue Adequacy. Subnational governments should have adequate revenues to 
discharge designated responsibilities. 
Equity. Allocated funds should vary directly with fiscal need factors and inversely with 
the taxable capacity of each jurisdiction (see Shah 1996 for an application). 
Predictability. The grant mechanism should ensure predictability of subnational 
governments’ shares by publishing five-year projections of funding availablility.  
Efficiency. The grant design should be neutral with respect to subnational government 
choices of resource allocatin to different sectors or different types of activity. 
Simplicity.  Grant allocation should be based on objective factors over which individual 
units have liitle control. The formula should be easy to comprehend so that 
grantsmanship is not rewarded. 
Incentives. The design should provide incentives for sound fiscal management and 
discourage inefficient practices. There should be no specific transfers to finance 
subnational government deficits. 
Safeguard of garntor’s objectives – accountability for results.  This is best done by 
having grant conditions specify results to be achieved and giving the recipient flexibility 
in the use of funds but holding the recipient accountable for results. 
Singular focus. Each grant should be focused on a single objective.    
 
  22
The various criteria specified above could be in conflict with each other and therefore a 
grantor may have to assign priorities to various factors in comparing design alternatives. 
 
 (c) Lessons from International Practices  
Shah (2003) provides a number of important lessons from worldwide practioces in 
intergovernmental transfers. These are reported here in verbatim to inform  our review of 
the China’s fiscal system.  
Negative Lessons: Practices to Avoid 
1.  To deal with vertical fiscal gap, general revenue sharing programs with multiple 
factors are to be avoided as they undermine accountability and do not advance 
fiscal efficiency or fiscal equity objectives. Tax by tax revenue sharing should 
also be avoided due to its possible perverse incentives for the donor tax 
administration.Tax decentralization or tax base sharing offer better alternatives to 
a general revenue sharing program as they enhance accountability while 
preserving subnational autonomy.  
2.  Grants to finance subnational deficits should be avoided as they create incentives 
for running higher deficits in future. 
3.  Avoid fiscal effort provisions in unconditional grant programs. Improving service 
delivery while lowering tax costs should be public sector objectives.  
4.  Input or process based or adhoc conditional grant programs undermine local 
autonomy, flexibility and fiscal efficiency and fiscal equity objectives.  
5.  Capital grants without assurance of funds for future upkeep should be avoided as 
they have the potential to create white elephants 
6.  Negotiated and/or discretionary transfers in general should be avoided in a 
decentralized fiscal system as these may create dissention and disunity. 
7.  Avoid setting up independent grant commissions/agencies outside the 
government. These agencies typically opt for complex solutions.     
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Positive Lessons: Practices to Strive for. 
1.  Keep it simple. In the design of fiscal transfers, rough justice may be better 
than full justice to keep the system simple and transparent so as to have wider 
acceptability. 
2.  Focus on a single objective only in one grant program and make the design 
consistent with this objective. Having multiple objectives in a grant program 
runs the risk of not achieving any one of those objectives.  
3.  Introduce sunset clauses. It is desirable to have the grant program reviewed 
periodically say every five years and renewed. In the intervening years, there 
should not be any changes in the program to provide certainty in budgetary 
programming for all governments.   
4.  Fiscal equalization is best achieved through a grant program that equalizes per 
capita fiscal capacity to a specified standard. Calculations required for fiscal 
capacity equalization using a representative tax system is  a relatively straight 
forward and less data intensive and less demanding exercise. Expenditure 
need equalization, while desirable, on the other hand, requires difficult and 
complex  and often subjective analysis inviting much controversy and debate. 
Fiscal need equalization is better achieved through output based per capita  
(per service population) national minimum standards grants.  
5.  In specific purpose grant programs, conditionality is best imposed on ouputs 
or standards of access and quality of services rather than on inputs and 
processes. This facilitates the achievement of grantor’s  objectives without 
undermining local choices on how best to deliver such services. Simple output 
based transfers can facilitate the achievement of national minimum standards. 
6.  There is no single model of institutional arrangements that is superior to 
others but it is important that all stakeholders are heard and appropriate 
compromise using objective criterion is struck acceptable to all. A national 
concensus on the standard of equalization is critically important for the    
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sustainability of the program.  Intergovernmental forums have worked well in 
several countries such as Canada and Germany.       
 
5. A Review of the Existing Structure of Intergovernmental Transfers in China 
 
In the following, individual grant programs are reviewed and then general conclusions 
are draws regarding the overall system of intergovernmental transfers in China. 
 
The General Purpose Transfers 
 
Revenue Sharing Transfers (tax sharing program) 
The VAT and personal and enterprise income taxes (PIT & EIT) were brought under 
central government administration in 1994 and 2002 respectively and a tax by tax sharing 
system was introduced under which at the present time 25% of VAT and 40% of  PIT and 
EIT revenues are returned by origin to the provinces. The centralized administration of 
these taxes assured a common base and uniform taxation across the country. This feature 
is particularly desirable for VAT administration. For residence based personal income 
taxes and residence based enterprise income taxes, uniformity of base is desirable but 
uniformity of tax rates can be foregone  in the interest of greater provincial autonomy and 
flexibility. While residence based personal income taxes are desirable the enterprise 
income taxes must be source based and should have formal income attribution rules to 
attribute income to various locations.  The residence based enterprise taxes have the 
potential to deprive poor provinces of significant revenues as company headquarters are 
usually located in richer provinces. In addition residence based enterprise taxes have the 
potential to encourage wasteful tax competition and beggar-thy-neighbor policies.   The 
existing system of tax by tax sharing weakens provincial flexibility and accountability as 
provincial governments no longer have the ability to vary the tax rates and to justify 
taxing choices to provincial residents. The tax by tax sharing feature of the existing 
arrangements is also not desirable, as conceptually, it may create incentives for central 
administration to make greater effort at the margin from raising revenues from bases that 
are not shared. In China, however, there is no evidence yet that such effect is operative.           
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The Tax Rebate Transfer 
As noted earlier the tax rebate program was instituted to assure provinces that 
centralization of tax administration would not have adverse consequences for their 
revenues. The program assured that provinces should expect to receive at least the same 
revenues they received from VAT in 1994 and the PIT and CIT in 2001.  This is a static 
guarantee with built in tendency to terminate itself after a few years. However, for VAT, 
a dynamic element was introduced by allowing last year’s rebate entitlement to be 
augmented by 30% of growth in VAT revenues.  This rebate is difficult to justify beyond 
the initial “hold harmless” provisions. Some scholars have argued that the tax effort 
incentives provided by this grant reward richer provinces and contribute to widening  
fiscal disparities among regions (Tsui 2005). 
 
The Equalization Grant 
In large and diverse country with decentralized fiscal system, fiscal equalization program 
is considered a glue that may hold the country together. China, in 1995, with the 
objective of advancing regional fiscal equity and harmony, adopted an objective   
comprehensive equalization program patterned after the Australian model. The program 
attempts to equalize both the fiscal capacity and expenditure needs. While the program 
aspires to be an ideal program conceptually, in practice, it is highly complex in design 
and unlikely to achieve regional fiscal equity objectives due to a number of design flaws.  
 
Equalization standard.  China just like Australia adopted an ad hoc year to year variable 
fixed pool that is unrelated to a consensus equalization standard.  A fixed pool negates 
commitment to having reasonably comparable levels of public services at reasonably 
comparable levels of fiscal burdens across the country.  
 
Implications of a centralized fiscal system for equalization.  The representative tax 
system is usually used to equalize to an explicitly defined standard, diverse revenue 
potential from local ownership and exploitation of tax bases under a decentralized fiscal 
system. China has a centralized fiscal system which limits the potency of a fiscal capacity 
equalization program. All major dynamic and productive tax bases are centralized. Like    
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Australia, provincial-local revenue base is small and unlike Australia, these governments 
do not have any autonomy in determining their own tax bases and rates.  Further national 
tax bureaus provide administrative supervision over provincial-local tax bureaus.  
 
Representative tax system (RTS) approach to equalize fiscal capacity. The RTS system is 
conceptually desirable but given the centralized fiscal system in China, application of a 
representative tax system approach to calculate potential yields complicates matters but 
unlikely to yield results variable from actual revenues. The variation will arise primarily 
from central tax collection agency performance on enforcement and compliance in 
various jurisdictions.  Note that potential yields are calculated to avoid the unwelcome 
incentive/disincentive effects in terms of tax administration with the use of actual 
revenues in equalization grants. The Chinese fiscal system parallels the German fiscal 
system in that local governments in both countries simply implement central tax policies 
and have little or no discretion in defining own bases and own tax rates. The German 
equalization system realizes this difficulty and thereby while adopting the representative 
tax system equalizes actual revenues. This keeps the system simple.  
 
Representative Expenditure System (RES).  Just like Australia, China uses the RES for 
expenditure need calculations. China uses even a greater degree of rigor than Australia in 
making such calculations. While such calculations are conceptually desirable, in practice 
they are just like the Australian calculations have a number of serious limitations. Such 
calculations, for example, for personnel expenditures assume a straight jacket 
management paradigm and would implicitly discourage innovative practices that 
emphasize managing for results such as alternate service delivery frameworks that 
embody elements of competitive provision and outsourcing. They also internalize 
generous and wasteful expenditure policies in richer provinces.  Similar concerns apply 
to other expenditure categories such as fuel expenditures etc. The econometric approach 
to RES assumes unchanging functions and modes of service delivery and stable 
coefficients – hardly plausible for a dynamic economy like China.  Australia abandoned 
an econometric approach to RES in the 1990s for the same reasons. Even their current    
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approach to expenditure need calculations is highly complex and controversial and a 
major source of discontent with the current equalization program.  
Overall, expenditure need equalization, while desirable, requires difficult and 
complex analysis inviting much controversy and debate. It also turns equalization into a 
black box for most people except a handful of hard core gurus.  In view of this, fiscal 
need compensation is best achieved through output based transfers for merit goods.  
        
In conclusion, China’s fiscal equalization is highly complex but lacks the basic ingredient 
of a good equalization system, namely that there should be an explicit equalization 
standard on which there is a broad societal consensus and this agreed standard in turn 
should determine both the total pool as well as allocation to provinces that are to be 
brought up to the national average standard.  Further such calculations should be based 
upon authentic data available to all and the overall system should be simple for a wider 
acceptance of the program.     
 
Specific Purpose Transfers 
China has a large number of specific purpose transfers to further national priorities and to 
enable provinces to implement national mandates.  A few better known programs are 
reviewed in the following paragraphs. 
 
Grants for Increasing Wages of Civil Servants 
This grant compensated provincial-local governments for centrally mandated wage 
increases during 1999-2001. This program made sense for the year it was instituted but 
rationale for maintaining this program in the long run is not clear. The program 
represents a tacit admission on the part of the central government that existing tax 
assignment and transfers are not commensurate with fiscal responsibilities at sub-national 
levels.  But such fiscal deficiency is best addressed through tax decentralization or tax 
base sharing programs. Providing grants for civil service wages create perverse incentives 
for inflating the payrolls. Other countries like Brazil have introduced fiscal responsibility 
legislation to cap the wage expenditures at all orders of government so that government    
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agencies have incentive to deliver services rather than work as employment creation 
agencies.     
 
Grants for Rural Tax Reform 
This transfer is intended to deal with fiscal gap for rural governments arising from the 
elimination of rural taxes and charges in 2000.  Again such transfer can only be a stop 
gap transitory measure and not a long term solution to problems of rural public finance. A 
long term solution requires an examination of options to reassign taxing and spending 
responsibilities and/or to institute output based transfers. 
 
Special Grant for Minority Regions 
Preserving diversity of cultures is an important goal of the Chinese government. 
Provinces inhabited with ethnic minorities receive an ad hoc grant equal to a base amount 
of 1 billion yuan in 2000 with a yearly growth rate of central VAT revenue and the rebate 
of the 80 percent of the central increased VAT collection in the minority provinces. 
While the rationale of this transfer is easy to justify, the specific design of a small ad hoc 
grant needs re-examination.   
 
Prior 1994 Subsidies 
These are subsidies equivalent to fiscal gap experienced by some provinces in 1993.  
They have been sustained for more than a decade.  These subsidies can no longer be 
justified. 
 
Other Ad Hoc Transfers 
China has more than 200 additional transfers from line agencies. There is not enough 
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6. Principal Issues with the Existing System   
 
The China’s fiscal transfer system is remarkable for transferring large sums of money in 
an objective manner to sub-national governments. This has enabled provincial-local 
government to deliver quantity and quality of public services better than most developing 
and emerging market economies.   Yet the system has a number of obvious limitations.   
 
1). Complex and opaque system. The equalization system is overly complex and there are 
large number of transfer programs designed in an ad hoc manner as short term palliatives   
to deal with emerging issues/crisis but allowed to continue in perpetuity without any 
serious review. The system is opaque and hardly a handful of experts have knowledge of 
all programs and their underlying allocation basis.   
 
2). Piecemeal approach to gap filling.  The vertical fiscal gaps created by the existing 
assignments at provincial and sub-provincial levels are quite large (see Table 6) and a 
large number of transfer programs are implemented to deal with this gap. These programs 
gives the appearance of fiscal dentistry as multitude of programs such as the tax by tax 
sharing, tax rebates, transfer for increasing wage expenditure of public employees, the 
transfer for rural tax-for-fee reform, the transfer for abandoning agriculture tax etc, are 
designed to fill fiscal gaps (cavities) partially.  
 









Central 71.0  30.1  40.9 
Provincial 5.7  18.5  (12.8) 
Subprovincial 23.3  51.4  (28.1) 
All orders  100.0  100.0  0.0 
Source: Authors’ calculations based upon unpublished data from the Ministry of Finance, China. 
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3). Lack of Central Coordination and Transparency. Due to China’s specific feature of 
bottom-up approving and consolidating budgets, the specific amount of transfers is 
unknown until the central budget is approved. Consequently, sub-national budgets are not 
able to reasonably estimate intergovernmental transfers until the central budget execution 
starts. For example, a 2003 audit report from the National Audit Bureau found that only 
22.5 percent of total intergovernmental subsidies from the central government got 
reported in the provincial accounts in 17 provinces audited. The story is further 
complicated by having a large number of agencies making almost independent 
determination of their grant programs without formal centralized review and coordination.  
 
4). Lack of Regulatory Framework for Intergovernmental Transfer System. All transfer 
programs in China are instituted by executive order and do not require formal legislative 
approval by the National People’s Congress. Further all programs lack a sunset clause 
and review requirements for renewal. This informality breeds incentives for transfer 
programs to be introduced in a “putting the fire out” fashion” i.e. to institute grant 
programs with emerging problems  without ensuing how various pieces of the puzzle fit 
together.  
 
5). Lack of consistency of design with objectives. Almost all programs fail to provide an 
incentive and accountability framework to provide reasonable assurance of achievement 
of objectives. The equalization program is state of the art in its technology but has no 
clear objectives and no standard and a variable ad hoc pool. There is no assurance of 
dealing with fiscal disparities according to a consensus standard.   
 
6). Focus on input controls. All specific purpose programs emphasize input controls with 
no accountability for results. There is not a single example of an output based transfer 
being practiced. There are no transfers to assure national minimum standards of basic 
services across the nation.  
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7).  Lack of Consistency of Management paradigm with China’s modern role.  The 
programs perpetuate a public management paradigm that is out of step with the role of 
China as a world leader in a globalized and localized world.  
 
8). One size fits all approach in provincial-local transfers.  Provincial-local transfers use 
the same allocation criteria as the central transfers. These criteria do not discriminate 
among local governments by type of local government, by population size class or 
urban/rural character of their services. This contributes to bottlenecks in delivery of rural 
services due to inadequate financing.    
 
7.  Pathways to Reform 
In presenting pathways to reform, we are primarily guided by economic rationale, 
principles of grant design and lessons from practices that were enunciated in section 4 
and the principal issues with China’s fiscal system identified in sections 5 and 6.  The 
following represents one possible package of policy reform options to deal with the 
principal issues. 
 
Tax base sharing or tax decentralization options to deal with the fiscal gap.  One possible 
option is to discontinue tax by tax sharing for PIT and EIT and allow supplementary 
variable flat rate charges by provincial-local governments. In addition, provincial-local 
governments may be given flexibility to set own tax rates within a defined band (range). 
It is also important to make EIT, a source based tax and have income attribution rules to 
attribute income to various locations based upon value added, employment and sales etc. 
This will allow western provinces to claw back additional enterprise income tax revenues. 
In addition, it will discourage wasteful inter-jurisdictional tax competition.  The proposed 
measures have the potential to reduce fiscal gap while enhancing accountability to local 
residents.  
 
Establish a legal framework and designate a coordinating ministry. Industrial countries 
and a growing number of developing countries require grant programs to be established 
through enabling umbrella legislation (fiscal arrangements act) and implementing    
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regulations and designate a coordinating body usually the Ministry of Finance. China 
may consider instituting a legislative framework for major grant programs and 
designating the State Council or the Ministry of Finance to play a coordinating role. In 
addition, a fiscal arrangements committee comprising the Centre, provinces and local 
government  chaired by the central Finance Minister, may be appointed to act as the 
primary initiating and deliberative body on central transfers.   
 
Establish a Framework for Fiscal Transparency, Responsibility and Accountability.  
The Central Government in China in the foreseeable future would remain a dominant 
source of financing subnational services especially in the Western regions and rural 
services for the country as a whole. Over time, China has afforded ever expanding 
autonomy to local governments. Under such an environment, it is important to establish a 
national framework for fiscal transparency, responsibility and accountability that is 
binding on all orders of government, to forestall future fiscal risks.  This framework 
should specify principles and rules for fiscal prudence and fiscal discipline, framework 
for responsible credit market access, framework for fiscal insolvency for local 
governments, transparency and access to information by all.  Recent experiences of 
Brazil and South Africa with such legislation may be instructive for China.  
 
Rationalize and simplify the fiscal equalization program. This can be done by introducing 
an explicit standard of equalization e.g. national average standard for fiscal capacity or a 
fraction of this standard.  This standard should determine both the pool and the allocation. 
Simplify the representative tax system and have fiscal capacity calculations done for 8 
bases:  only VAT,  PIT and EIT, Business Tax, Urban maintenance and construction tax, 
housing property tax, vehicles taxes and all other sundry taxes combined. User charges 
should be excluded from these calculations.  Discontinue the representative expenditure 
system (RES) for fiscal need calculations and instead use per capita (per service 
population) output based transfers for national merit goods as discussed below. 
 
Institute National Minimum Standards Grants. This can be done by introducing output 
based fiscal transfers to achieve national minimum standards in merit goods such as    
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education, health, infrastructure etc. These transfers could be based on relevant service 
population (see education example in Box 1).  They must also recognize a larger role of 
the central government in financing rural services in view of  the inadequate potential for 
raising adequate own source revenues by rural areas.  
 
Box 1. An example of a performance oriented grant: education grant to set 
minimum standards, while encouraging competition and innovation 
Allocation basis among local governments: school age population. 
Distribution to providers: equal per pupil to both government and private schools. 
Conditions: universal access to primary and secondary education regardless of parents’ income; 
improvements in achievement scores; no condition on the use of grant funds. 
Penalties for non-compliance with standards: public censure, reduction of grant funds. 
Incentives for cost efficiency: retention of savings. 
Source: Shah (2002) 
 
Provincial-local transfers must recognize the urban/rural, size class of local governments.   
General purpose transfers to local governments require special consideration as local 
governments vary in population, size, area served and the type of services offered e.g. 
urban versus rural. In view of this, it would be advisable to classify local governments by 
population size, municipality type, and urban/rural distinction and have a separate 
formula for each class and type of municipalities. It is also important to give special 
consideration to financing of rural services. 
 
Introduce capital transfers and responsible access to borrowing to deal with 
infrastructure deficiencies.  To deal with infrastructure deficiencies, a varying blend of 
capital grant finance and responsible access to borrowing may be needed in different 
provinces. The central government may consider providing local governments with 
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